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Abstract. The model of rational decision-making in most of economics
and statistics is expected utility theory (EU) axiomatised by von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern, Savage and others. This is less the case, how-
ever, in financial economics and mathematical finance, where invest-
ment decisions are commonly based on the methods of mean–variance
(MV) introduced in the 1950s by Markowitz. Under the MV framework,
each available investment opportunity (“asset”) or portfolio is repre-
sented in just two dimensions by the ex ante mean and standard de-
viation (µ,σ) of the financial return anticipated from that investment.
Utility adherents consider that in general MV methods are logically in-
coherent. Most famously, Norwegian insurance theorist Borch presented
a proof suggesting that two-dimensional MV indifference curves cannot
represent the preferences of a rational investor (he claimed that MV
indifference curves “do not exist”). This is known as Borch’s paradox
and gave rise to an important but generally little-known philosophical
literature relating MV to EU. We examine the main early contribu-
tions to this literature, focussing on Borch’s logic and the arguments
by which it has been set aside.
Key words and phrases: Mean–variance, expected utility, Borch’s para-
dox, probability mixture, portfolio theory, CAPM.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper looks back at a little-known but highly
interesting chapter in the history of business decision-
making (call it “investment”) under uncertainty. In
a once feˆted but now rarely mentioned paper, ti-
tled politely A Note on Uncertainty and Indiffer-
ence Curves, the Norwegian insurance theorist and
economist Karl Borch (1969) argued that the mean–
variance theory of investment, invented and popu-
larized by Markowitz (1952, 1959), is logically ab-
surd. In this delightfully provocative note, Borch
(1969) proved, he claimed, that it is impossible to
draw indifference curves in the mean–variance (µ,σ2)
or mean–standard deviation (µ,σ) plane. The same
proof appears in at least two other works by Borch
(1973, 1974), who concluded that mean–variance is
an interesting but not serious alternative to expected
utility:
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. . . I shall continue to use mean–variance anal-
ysis in teaching, but I shall warn students that
such analysis must not be taken seriously and
applied in practice (Borch (1974), page 430).
The proof presented by Borch (pronounced
“Bork”) became known to theorists as “Borch’s para-
dox”. While of much interest theoretically, the aca-
demic discussion that stemmed from Borch’s work
had virtually no impact on the practice of finance.
To the contrary, mean–variance (MV) analysis, for
which Markowitz later won a Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomic Sciences, has become by far the most recog-
nized decision framework in the practice of business
decision-making, including especially capital bud-
geting (e.g., whether to build a new factory), in-
vestment management (e.g., whether to increase the
weight of oil stocks in a pension fund) and cor-
porate financial valuation (e.g., whether a firm is
worth its current value on the stock market). Each
of these common applications is built implicitly on
MV, and explicitly on the so-called “capital asset
pricing model” (CAPM) that arose as a corollary
from the MV foundations set out by Markowitz.
Although business applications of MV portfolio
theory and the CAPM are commonplace, and ef-
fectively the industry standard (witness any mod-
ern textbook in financial economics), proponents of
this decision framework remain conscious that the
proven philosophical foundations of decision analy-
sis under uncertainty remain the axioms and the-
orems of expected utility theory (EU), formalized
by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) and Sav-
age (1954). Utility theory, or more specifically the
maximization of subjective expected utility satisfy-
ing the von Neumann–Morgenstern or similar ax-
ioms, remains the hallmark of rationality in eco-
nomics and statistical decision analysis (e.g., De-
Groot (1970); Bernardo and Smith (1994); Pratt,
Raiffa and Schlaifer (1995); Lengwiler (2004); Eeck-
houdt, Gollier and Schlesinger (2005)). As a mark of
respect for this intellectual legacy, Markowitz (1991)
devoted his 1990 Nobel Lecture to an empirical com-
parison of his MV methods of portfolio selection
with a model based on EU theory. Authoritative
recognition also goes the other way. In its second edi-
tion, one of the standard references on neoclassical
decision theory, Pratt, Raiffa and Schlaifer (1995)
contains an elegant exposition of the MV investment
framework, albeit without reconciliation with other
explicitly EU parts of the book. Completing the cir-
cle, Markowitz (2006) and Rubinstein (2006a) have
lately pointed to an early paper in Italian, authored
by de Finetti (1940), the most revered of all sub-
jective probability theorists, as having been first to
express a formal model of decision-making within
a MV framework. Two further expositions concen-
trated on de Finetti’s previously little-known antic-
ipation of Markowitz are Barone (2008) and Pres-
sacco and Serafini (2007).
Our primary purpose is to examine the histori-
cal literature surrounding Borch’s paradox. To as-
sist readers who are not familiar with this branch
of applied statistical literature, we first recount the
basic elements of investment decision-making under
the two competing conceptual frameworks, expected
utility and mean–variance. We then consider how
MV can be justified on axiomatic foundations, in
the face of critics such as Borch, and by comparison
with EU theory generally. Finally, to better under-
stand the practical appeal of MV methods, and why
finance theory so readily adopted the language of
MV over EU, we introduce the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM) and observe how such a theoret-
ically insightful model arose almost automatically
once decisions were depicted in terms of MV rather
than EU.
2. EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY
A decision is a choice between some (usually strict)
subset of all of the available “lotteries,” “assets,”
“investments” (these terms are synonyms)—and all
feasible weighted portfolios thereof. Each such un-
certain prospect reduces to a probability distribu-
tion over a domain of possible payoffs. Decision-
making is therefore boiled down to a choice between
different possible probability distributions of returns.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) proposed
an axiomatic theory of how to decide between known
probability distributions (of payoffs). In brief, they
proved deductively that if decision-making is logi-
cal in the sense that it obeys certain specified basic
axioms of coherence or rationality, then implicitly
the decision-maker must act as if her objective is
to maximize expected utility E[u(x)] =
∫
x
f(x)u(x),
where u(x) is a real-valued function representing the
utility obtained from certain wealth or payoff x, and
f(x) is the probability density function of x. The
decision rule of maximizing E[u(x)], taken in con-
junction with some plausible looking utility function
such as Bernoulli’s u(x) = log(x), is often treated as
itself axiomatic. More correctly, the extra-intuitive
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appeal of the EU decision rule is that rather than
being just another plausible looking but arbitrary
objective function, it is a theorem deduced from a
small number of far more elementary assumptions
concerning what constitutes rational human prefer-
ences.
There are five essential axioms of expected util-
ity: (i) Completeness. All lotteries A and B can be
ranked relative to one another, A ≻ B, A ≺ B or
A ∼ B, where ∼ indicates indifference. (ii) Transi-
tivity. If A B and B  C, then A C. (iii) Con-
tinuity. If AB C, there exists some probability
α ∈ [0,1] such that B ∼ αA+(1−α)C, meaning that
B is indifferent to a compound lottery that returns
lottery A with probability α and lottery C with
probability (1− α). (iv) Independence. Indifference
A ∼ B between lotteries A and B implies indiffer-
ence between compound lottery αA+ (1−α)C and
compound lottery αB + (1−α)C. Similarly, A≻B
implies αA+ (1− α)C ≻ αB + (1− α)C, for α > 0.
(v) Dominance. Let C1 be the compound lottery
α1A+ (1− α1)B and let C2 be the compound lot-
tery α2A+(1−α2)B. If A≻B, then C1 ≻C2 if and
only if α1 > α2.
For further interpretation of these axioms and
proof of how they lead to the von Neumann and
Morgenstern EU decision rule, see Pennacchi (2008),
pages 4–11. Similar expositions are found in many
textbooks both in economics and statistics. See, for
example, Ingersoll (1987), pages 30–44, Huang and
Litzenberger (1988), pages 1–11, and Levy (2012),
pages 25–30. In brief, by assuming the primitive
preference relationships (i)–(v), it is shown that lot-
tery A is preferred to lottery B if and only if the ex-
pected utility of lottery A exceeds the expected util-
ity of lottery B. Expected utility E[u(x)] is therefore
the proven measure by which to rank uncertain in-
vestments.
The usual assumption in economics is that decision-
makers are risk averse. This means that they have
positive but diminishing marginal utility for money,
and hence u(x) is increasing and concave. A risk
averse decision-maker will not accept any lottery
with an expected money value of zero (or less). Ac-
tuarially fair bets are thus unacceptable. Before ac-
cepting a bet to win or lose some fixed sum c, a risk
averse agent requires that the probability of win-
ning exceeds 0.5 by some premium. The amount of
this premium depends on the local concavity of u(x)
or on how fast the marginal utility of money is di-
minishing in the region of wealth x0 ± c, where x0
is her starting wealth. Technically, the Pratt–Arrow
measure of local absolute risk aversion −u′′(x)/u′(x)
captures the degree of concavity of u or the rate at
which marginal utility is decreasing at wealth x.
3. MEAN–VARIANCE THEORY
The following quick summary of MV owes much to
Liu (2004). The one-period return on an investment
over period t is defined as (pt+ d)/pt−1, where pt is
the time t asset price and d is the income (dividend)
drawn from the asset in period t. This definition has
the advantage that the returns measure is always
positive.
Imagine a set of available investments or “assets”.
These can be combined into arbitrarily weighted
portfolios (e.g., the investor might form a 2:1 weight-
ed portfolio of assets A and B, where two-thirds of
her money is invested in A and one-third in B). The
available assets and their linearly weighted portfo-
lios form an opportunity set of investments. Each
possible asset or portfolio presents a compromise
between mean return µ and variance σ2. Each such
MV pair is reduced following Markowitz and finance
convention to its parameters (σ,µ). The opportunity
set is then a region of feasible (σ,µ) pairs. This re-
gion is depicted in its characteristic shape by the
bullet-like shaded area in Figure 1. The investor is
generally risk averse and thus prefers portfolios with
higher mean return µ and lower “risk” (standard
deviation) σ. The opportunity set is reduced there-
fore to just those portfolios on the thick black arc
called the “efficient frontier”. Each asset portfolio on
the efficient frontier dominates all assets and portfo-
lios to its southeast, because these have both lower
µ and higher σ. For example, asset (σ,µ)-pair H
dominates all assets and portfolios in the hatched
region.
Fig. 1. Graphical presentation of MV(σ,µ) analysis.
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To choose between all efficient portfolios, the in-
vestor forms a family of MV indifference curves.
These are understood as equivalue curves defined by
some indifference function V (σ,µ). Each such curve
shows the locus of (σ,µ) points for which V (σ,µ)
is held constant. A typical looking family of indif-
ference curves is shown by the dotted lines in Fig-
ure 1. These curves are drawn convex downwards
on the basis that, for assets known only by their
MV parameters (σ,µ), the risk averse investor re-
quires marginally greater compensation in µ for each
further increment in risk σ (see Meyer (1987), for
related proofs). Since risk averse investors prefer
lower σ for fixed µ, higher (more northwesterly) in-
difference curves represent greater expected utility
to the investor. Having established both the effi-
cient frontier and an indifference function V (σ,µ),
the unique MV-optimal investment in risky assets
is located at the point of tangency T between the
decision-maker’s own V (σ,µ) and the exogenous ef-
ficient frontier.
4. BORCH’S PARADOX
Borch (1969), pages 2 and 3, presented a proof
based on assets with two-point distributions that
revealed (he claimed) that it is impossible to draw
indifference curves in the mean–variance (µ,σ2) or
mean–standard deviation (µ,σ) plane. Borch repeat-
ed this same proof in 1973 and 1974, and wrote
openly of his frustration that it was not more widely
acknowledged by theorists developing portfolio op-
timization methods:
I have on several occasions (1969) and (1974)
tried to warn against the uncritical use of mean–
variance analysis. It was probably too much to
expect that these warnings should have much
effect (Borch (1978), page 181).
The Borch paradox goes as follows. First, assume
that two assets (payoff distributions) with parame-
ters (µ1, σ
2
1
) and (µ2, σ
2
2
) are regarded, on the ba-
sis of those parameters alone, as indifferent (i.e., of
equal subjective merit). Now imagine two hypothet-
ical assets constructed simply as two-point distribu-
tions. Asset 1 produces payoff y1 with probability p
and payoff x with probability (1− p). Asset 2 pro-
duces payoff y2 with probability p and payoff x with
probability (1− p). By common sense or some very
basic axiom like the “sure thing” principle raised by
Savage (Borch cites Allais’ concept of “preference
absolue”), these two assets are indifferent if and only
if y1 = y2 (p > 0).
Now, suppose that the constants x, p, y1 and y2
take values
x=
σ1µ2 − σ2µ1
σ1 − σ2
,(1)
p=
(µ1 − µ2)
2
(µ1 − µ2)2 + (σ1 − σ2)2
,(2)
y1 = µ1+ σ1
(σ1 − σ2)
(µ1 − µ2)
,(3)
y2 = µ2+ σ2
(σ1 − σ2)
(µ1 − µ2)
.(4)
Borch did not make any mention of where these
equations come from or what they assume, except to
say that it is easy to verify that the implied values of
the mean and variance parameters of the two assets
are, respectively, (µ1, σ
2
1
) and (µ2, σ
2
2
), thus match-
ing assets 1 and 2 (this is indeed easily verified).
The final step in Borch’s proof holds that because
the two assets can be of equal merit only if y1 = y2,
the indifference condition (3) = (4) is
µ1 + σ1
(σ1 − σ2)
(µ1 − µ2)
= µ2 + σ2
(σ1 − σ2)
(µ1 − µ2)
,
implying that (µ1−µ2)
2+(σ1−σ2)
2 = 0 and, hence,
indifference requires that µ1 = µ2 and σ1 = σ2. Ac-
cording to Borch’s interpretation of this result, any
supposed indifference between two arbitrary mean–
variance pairs is impossible, unless of course they
are the same. Mean–variance indifference curves are
thus merely points rather than curves, or, in Borch’s
[(1969), page 3] own words, “it is impossible to draw
indifference curves in the E–S-plane” (E and S de-
note the mean and standard deviation).
In answer to any suspicion raised by their non-
explanation, there is nothing contrived about the
four equations used by Borch to define the constants
x, p, y1 and y2 in his proof. Rather, these can be
derived by writing the standard equations for the
means and standard deviations, µ1, µ2, σ1 and σ2,
of the two Borch two-point assets in terms of x, p, y1
and y2, and then solving these four equations simul-
taneously to get general expressions for all four con-
stants in terms of the specified means and standard
deviations. It follows, therefore, that the four Borch
equations, numbered (1)–(4) above, are not merely
sufficient conditions to produce the specified mean–
variance parameters (µ1, σ
2
1) and (µ2, σ
2
2). Rather,
they follow necessarily from those specified param-
eter values as one of two possible sets of solutions.
The second set of solutions, which Borch did not
raise but could have employed to the same effect, is
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as follows:
x=
σ1µ2 + σ2µ1
σ1 + σ2
,
p=
(µ1 − µ2)
2
(µ1 − µ2)2 + (σ1 + σ2)2
,
y1 = µ1+ σ1
(σ1 + σ2)
(µ1 − µ2)
,
y2 = µ2+ σ2
(σ1 + σ2)
(µ1 − µ2)
.
4.1 Our Interpretation of Borch
Borch interprets his paradox to say that mean–
variance indifference curves cannot exist. This is too
strong, as will be seen in the sections below. More
reasonable interpretations of Borch’s proof are as
follows.
Interpretation 1: Suppose that a decision-maker
is adamant that he is indifferent between any two
assets with mean–variance characteristics (µ1, σ
2
1)
and (µ2, σ
2
2), where (µ1, σ
2
1) 6= (µ2, σ
2
2). It is possi-
ble to construct two-point assets with these very
characteristics between which no one can reasonably
be indifferent [these can be constructed by Borch’s
equations (1)–(4), or equally well with the second
possible set of solutions noted above].
This possibility does not imply that there are no
possible assets with parameters (µ1, σ
2
1) and (µ2, σ
2
2)
that are rationally (to someone) indifferent. Rather,
it shows that the decision-maker cannot be indiffer-
ent between all imaginable pairs of assets with these
parameters.
Interpretation 2: If we limit consideration to only
the particular subclass of two-point assets construct-
ed by Borch, there exists no pair of assets with
(µ1, σ
2
1
) 6= (µ2, σ
2
2
) between which anyone might rea-
sonably be indifferent. Rather, whenever (µ1, σ
2
1
) 6=
(µ2, σ
2
2), the two assets (having x and p in com-
mon) necessarily differ in that y1 6= y2, which of itself
means that they cannot be indifferent.
4.2 Numerical Illustration
Here we exemplify Interpretation 1 numerically.
Imagine that the subject of the experiment feels
that he is indifferent between any two assets with
parameters (µ1, σ
2
1
) = (10,225) and (µ2, σ
2
2
) = (20,625).
Such subjective indifference would typically require
that the security with the bigger mean has the big-
ger variance, but that practicality is not necessary
in Borch’s demonstration. Now consider two compa-
rable lottery tickets, ticket A and ticket B. Ticket A
pays 25 with probability p= 0.5 and −5 with prob-
ability (1−p). Similarly, ticket B pays 45 with prob-
ability p= 0.5 and −5 with probability (1− p). The
mean–variance parameters of these two lotteries are
(10,225) and (20,625), respectively. Yet contrary
to any thought that two assets with these param-
eters are indifferent, ticket B is obviously preferred
because it has the same probability of winning as
ticket A, and the same payoff if it loses, but pays 45
instead of 25 when it wins. Borch saw this appar-
ent contradiction as proof that the decision-maker
cannot logically be indifferent between two invest-
ments by reference only to their means and vari-
ances.
5. BARON’S REBUTTAL OF BORCH
Borch’s paradox is well known to those economic
theorists mindful of foundations and interested in
the history of mean–variance, yet is largely unknown
elsewhere and goes unmentioned in standard finance
and financial economics texts, even in highly so-
phisticated works such as Ingersoll (1987), Cochrane
(2001), Barucci (2003), Lengwiler (2004) and Pen-
nacchi (2008) that deal with the connections be-
tween mean–variance models and expected utility
theory. Neither is Borch mentioned in the very thor-
ough historical annotated bibliography of Rubin-
stein (2006b). This omission is justified perhaps by
the findings of a similarly important but now rarely
mentioned paper by Baron (1977).
Baron rebuts Borch’s paradox in two steps. First
comes the proposition that decision-making based
on just the two parameters, mean and variance, im-
plies an underlying quadratic utility function. The
same argument arises in Hanoch and Levy [(1970),
page 182] and Sarnat [(1974), page 687] who both
note that quadratic (second order polynomial) util-
ity is the only form of mathematical utility func-
tion for which expected utility reduces to a function
of just the first two moments of the payoff distri-
bution. Specifically, for risk-averse quadratic utility
u(x) = 2ax − x2, the expected utility is E[u(x)] =
2aµ− (µ2+σ2). Similarly, see the derivation by Liu
(2004), page 233.
The presumption that MV necessarily implies qua-
dratic utility traces to Markowitz [(1959), page 288]
and also Mossin (1973), pages 26 and 27. Hanoch
and Levy [(1970), page 182] hold that “rejection of
quadratic utility implies the rejection of any anal-
ysis based on the expected utility maxim”, which
is indirectly saying that the only unconditional way
of hanging onto EU while applying MV is to adopt
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quadratic utility. Johnstone and Lindley (2011) have
more recently given an elementary proof revealing
that, in the absence of any further premise, MV ne-
cessitates quadratic utility.
Having concluded that Borch’s proposed subjec-
tive value function can arise from only a quadratic
utility function, Baron’s second step is to show that
one of the asset pairs in Borch’s counterexample,
(µ1, σ
2
1
) and (µ2, σ
2
2
), must involve a potential payoff
in the domain where quadratic utility is decreasing
with money. This finding is easy to understand in-
tuitively. The two Borch assets are identical except
that y1 6= y2 and, hence, the asset with the lower y
(e.g., asset 1 if y1 < y2) can only be as good in some-
one’s mind as the asset with the higher y if that
higher y is in the domain where money has negative
marginal utility, thus allowing y1 and y2 to have the
same utility u(yi).
The net effect of Baron’s argument can be sum-
marized as follows:
(i) Borch’s paradox proves only that for any two
mean–variance pairs, (µ1, σ
2
1) and (µ2, σ
2
2), a ratio-
nal decision-maker cannot be indifferent between all
pairs of assets with the specified parameters. In-
deed, precisely as Borch revealed, there are easily
definable assets with such characteristics which are
obviously not indifferent.
(ii) If the decision-maker has quadratic utility,
EU can be written as a function of mean and vari-
ance alone and, hence, (σ,µ) indifference curves do
exist. It is necessary, however, to constrain the class
of assets under consideration so as to exclude any
asset with one (or more than one) potential pay-
off in the region where utility decreases with money.
Negative marginal utility for some x is a well-known
limitation of quadratic utility, and is bound to pro-
duce irrational or incoherent decisions even under
EU if the admissible asset class is not suitably re-
stricted.
(iii) If assets with possible payoffs in the domain
where quadratic utility decreases with money (i.e.,
where the last increment of payoff brings a reduc-
tion in utility) are excluded a priori from considera-
tion, as if they cannot exist, then the class of coun-
terexamples constructed by Borch (and illustrated
numerically above) no longer exists.
Another somewhat forgotten finding should be
mentioned here. Taking MV as a representation of
quadratic utility, and constraining all possible pay-
offs into the domain where quadratic utility is in-
creasing, Levy and Sarnat [(1972), pages 387 and
388] proved that one MV asset pair (µ1, σ
2
1
) has
higher utility than another (µ2, σ
2
2
), with µ1 > µ2,
if and only if (µ1 − µ2)
2 − (σ1 − σ2)
2 > 0. This is a
stronger condition than the usual definition of dom-
inance (i.e., µ1 ≥ µ2 and σ1 < σ2 or µ1 > µ2 and
σ1 ≤ σ2) and is therefore more “efficient” in the
sense that it reduces the class of possible invest-
ments to a smaller number.
6. BURIDAN’S AXIOM AND
MEAN–VARIANCE
We now summarize our own disproof of gener-
alized mean–variance analysis, very much in spirit
with Borch, and then side with Baron by consider-
ing possible theoretical and practical restrictions on
the admissible asset class that allow a partial recon-
ciliation between the two ways of decision-making.
Following a convention in finance dating to Mar-
kowitz’s original exposition of the mean–variance
framework, our analysis is set out in terms of the
standard deviation σ rather than variance σ2. Ad-
hering to another well-entrenched custom in the fi-
nance literature, we work with σ as abscissa and µ
as ordinate.
6.1 Decision Axioms in Terms of (σ,µ)
Suppose there exists a value function g(σ,µ) that
captures the merit or goodness of a (σ,µ)-asset such
that larger g implies greater value. Indifference be-
tween two assets (σ1, µ1) and (σ2, µ2) means that
g(σ1, µ1) = g(σ2, µ2). It is not necessary to be ex-
plicit about the form of g.
Continuity-monotonicity-finiteness (CMF ) axiom.
The merit function g(σ,µ) is continuous, strictly in-
creasing in µ for every σ, and strictly decreasing
in σ for every µ. These properties hold throughout
the (σ,µ) half-plane, σ ≥ 0. Continuity implies that
there is no abrupt change in merit as either σ or
µ changes slightly. Strict monotonicity reflects the
merit, either positive or negative, of any change in
µ or σ, however small. Finiteness requires that any
finite increase in σ can be offset by a sufficiently
large finite increase in µ. The existence of such a
merit function implies transitivity, meaning that if
asset X is preferred to Y, and Y to Z, then X is pre-
ferred to Z (and likewise when preference is replaced
by indifference).
Buridan’s axiom. If a decision-maker is indifferent
between two assets i= 1 and i= 2, then he must also
be indifferent between either asset and a probability-
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Fig. 2. Axiomatic decision analysis in terms of (σ,µ).
mixture asset that yields (the same payoff as) i= 1
with probability α and (the same payoff as) i = 2
with probability (1−α), where α takes any value α ∈
[0,1]. Thus, according to the merit function g(σ,µ),
indifference g(σ1, µ1) = g(σ2, µ2) implies g(σ1, µ1) =
g(σ2, µ2) = g(σα, µα), where σα and µα represent the
mean and standard deviation of an α-mixture of the
two indifferent “pure” assets (for any probability α).
Note that Buridan’s axiom is a simple corollary of
the independence axiom in EU.
The question now is whether a decision analysis
constructed solely in terms of (σ,µ) can coexist with
these two axioms. Consider an asset with σ = 0,
known in finance as a “risk-free” asset and approx-
imated by government bonds. Let this asset return
µ0, as represented by the point A in Figure 2 with
coordinates (0, µ0). Now take any fixed σ1 > 0 and
points (σ1, µ) for all µ > 0. These represent risky as-
sets, among which asset B with coordinates (σ1, µ0)
is inferior to (has lower “merit” than) asset A be-
cause it has µ = µ0 but greater σ. As µ increases
from µ0, the assets on σ = σ1 increase in merit, such
that at some point C, with coordinates (σ1, µ1), the
higher return µ1 = µ0 is just sufficient to compen-
sate for the associated risk σ1, leaving the decision-
maker indifferent between C and A. The existence
of µ1 is guaranteed by the CMF axiom.
Assuming that the decision-maker is indifferent
between asset A at (σ0 = 0, µ0) and asset C at (σ1,
µ1), Buridan’s axiom dictates that this indifference
extends to a randomized mixture of A and C, where
A is selected with chance α. The payoff x from such
an α-mixture asset of any pair (σ0, µ0) and (σ1, µ1)
has expectations
µ=E(x) = αµ0 + (1−α)µ1(5)
and
E(x2) = α(µ20 + σ
2
0) + (1− α)(µ
2
1 + σ
2
1)
= αµ20 + (1−α)(µ
2
1 + σ
2
1) (σ0 = 0).
Since var(x) =E(x2)−E(x)2, simple algebra gives
σ2 = var(x)
= ασ20 + (1−α)σ
2
1 + α(1−α)(µ1 − µ0)
2(6)
= (1− α)σ21 +α(1− α)(µ1 − µ0)
2 (σ0 = 0)
in the same way as found by Baron (1977), page
1685. Note that equations (5) and (6) hold generally
for fixed α and do not require σ0 = 0 or independent
payoffs.
Equation (5) says that the mean of the mixture
asset is a weighted average of µ0 and µ1. Equation
(6) says that the variance does not have this prop-
erty; its value is not simply ασ20 + (1− α)σ
2
1 , but is
inflated by an extra term, α(1−α)(µ1−µ0)
2, deter-
mined by the difference between the two underlying
means.
To satisfy Buridan, the decision-maker must be
indifferent between the two original assets, A and
C, and a set of α-mixture assets with parameters
(σα, µα) given by (5) and (6), with α taking values
between 0 and 1. These assets lie on a curve connect-
ing A and C. The equation of this curve (which is the
indifference curve implied by the Buridan axiom) is
found by solving (5) and (6) so as to eliminate α,
giving
σ2 + [µ− (ρ0 + µ0)]
2 = ρ20,(7)
where ρ0 =
1
2
[σ21/(µ1 − µ0) + (µ1 − µ0)].
Note that the Buridan-based indifference curve
(7) has the form of a circle in the (σ,µ) plane, with
centre at (0, µ0+ ρ0) and radius ρ0 (hence the nota-
tion). To be sensible, no two indifference circles can
intersect.
Although (7) represents a full circle, further con-
siderations reveal that only part of this circle con-
stitutes a sensible indifference curve. The part of
(7) with σ < 0 may be ignored because negative σ
does not exist. The quarter circle DE can also be
ignored, because any point on (7) between D and E
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is better than D. It has smaller σ and larger µ and
hence must be preferred under the continuity axiom.
This leaves as a plausible indifference curve only the
quarter circle AD, of which only the part between A
and C is justified so far, having been derived from
the Buridan axiom.
It remains, therefore, to examine the arc between
C and D, for which σ1 <σ ≤ ρ0. Let σ
∗ fall in this in-
terval, and consider all assets (σ∗, µ) on the vertical
line through σ = σ∗. Just as for σ1, the CMF axiom
requires that there is an asset F on this line with
sufficiently high µ to make the decision-maker in-
different between F and the risk-free asset A. When
applied to σ∗, the logic relating to σ1, which led to
an indifference circle through A and C, produces an
indifference circle through A and F, intersecting the
line through BC. This is possible only when F lies on
the original circle through AC. Otherwise there are
two indifference points, both with σ = σ1 yet with
different means µ. Repeating this argument for all
possible σ∗ in the interval σ1 < σ
∗ ≤ ρ0, the indif-
ference circle through AC is found to extend to D,
thus completing the quarter circle AD.
Consider next any asset with σ > ρ0. The decision-
maker cannot be indifferent between a point in this
region and A. Buridan’s axiom would have any such
point on the same indifference circle as A and, in
repeat of the argument above, there would be con-
tradictions where that curve intersected any line of
constant σ < ρ0, such as the line through B and C.
More specifically, it follows that all points in the
region σ > ρ0 must be worse than A. To see this,
consider point L which has the same mean as A yet
is worse than A because of its higher standard devi-
ation. Now imagine that there is some point like G
that has a mean so large that it is better than A, de-
spite having the same standard deviation as L. Then
by continuity there must be a point between L and
G that is indifferent to A. But again this is impossi-
ble because of the contradictions it would cause with
the existing indifference curve. Hence, all points like
L with σ > ρ0 must be inferior to A, and thus lie on
a lower (larger radius) indifference curve than AD.
Finally, consider assets about the northeast quad-
rant with respect to D, for which µ > µ0 + ρ0 and
σ > ρ0. More particularly, consider three assets la-
belled H and K and M that define a rectangle with
corners HKMD. Of these, H is preferred to D, since
it has higher mean µ′ > µ0 + ρ0 and the same stan-
dard deviation σ > ρ0. Likewise, D is preferred to M
because it has the same mean and lower σ. Thus,
letting ≻ symbolize “is preferred to”, H ≻ D ≻M.
Similarly, H≻K≻M, by the same reasoning. Unfor-
tunately, however, these preferences do not complete
the rectangle, since they do not imply any ordering
between D and K.
To see the problem here, suppose to begin with
D≻K. Then H ≻ D ≻ K, so D is intermediate be-
tween K and H. However, K and H are on a line
of constant mean, so there must be an asset N on
this line between H and K that is indifferent to D,
and thus also indifferent to A, thus contradicting
the indifference circle AD already in place. By an
identical argument, this time assuming K≻ D (for-
getting for a moment that this ordering has already
been shown impossible), there must be some further
point P on the line of constant σ between M and K
that is indifferent to D and A, again contradicting
the existing indifference curve AD.
It is impossible, therefore, to resolve all preference
relationships within the rectangle HKMD in a way
consistent with Buridan and the CMF axiom. The
only way to avoid this inconsistency is to exclude all
assets such as K with µ > µ0 + ρ0 and σ > ρ0 from
the class of assets under consideration. In effect, this
rules out all points µ > µ0 + ρ0 above line RD in
Figure 1, since asset D lies on an indifference circle
centred at µ0 + ρ0 and of arbitrary radius. The im-
plication, therefore, is that it is not possible to rank
the class of all possible assets on a MV basis in a
way that is consistent with axioms that would seem
essential to any coherent MV decision framework.
This reaffirms the counterexample of Borch (1969),
but is reached by a more general line of reasoning.
7. RECONCILING MV AND EU
FRAMEWORKS
Contrary to Borch’s paradox, it is possible to man-
ufacture sensible (σ,µ) indifference curves by either
constraining the asset class (in the way as described
above) or by placing other restrictions on the deci-
sion model that limit its theoretical generality and
possible practical relevance. We now discuss the most
common ways of forming workable indifference curves,
by which we mean an MV decision framework that
yields the same investment choices (identical rank-
ings of a given set of distributions) as those based
explicitly on EU.
7.1 Quadratic Utility
Mean–variance analysis can be put to work on the
generally implausible assumption of quadratic util-
ity, provided that the returns on the available assets
are constrained to suit this particular utility func-
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tion. Since any utility function has arbitrary loca-
tion and scale, there is only one parameter free to
select and we may write any risk averse quadratic
utility as u(x) = 2ax− x2, for some a > 0, implying
u(0) = 0 and a maximum of a2 at x= a. Expected
utility is then
EU = 2aµ− (σ2 + µ2)
(8)
=−σ2 − (µ− a)2 + a2,
and the indifference curves are circles with centres
at (0, a) and various radii depending on the common
fixed EU. Since these circles have been obtained us-
ing expected utility, they automatically satisfy Buri-
dan.
Quadratic utility (QU) exhibits negative marginal
utility beyond a point of personal satiation. A coher-
ent EU decision framework might nonetheless as-
sume QU provided that none of the class of assets
(distributions) under consideration offers possible
wealth x in the domain where u(x) is decreasing
in x. The point of maximum possible quadratic util-
ity, x= a, is represented by R = (0, a) in Figure 2,
where in that instance a equals µ0 + ρ0.
The condition that no possible payoff x exceeds
a, where x is either a certain or uncertain outcome,
implies of course that µ≤ a. Thus, by applying this
condition concerning possible payoffs x to all ad-
missible assets, the analysis admits only assets with
µ < a, and thus only assets sitting below asset R
(line RD) in Figure 2. This is the region of the (σ,µ)
half-plane that we found admissible in our axiomatic
critique of MV.
It is important to note, however, that it is not
sufficient to exclude any asset with µ≥ a [for which
d(EU )/dµ = 2(a− µ)≤ 0] because this condition is
not strong enough to exclude all assets with one or
more possible wealth payoffs x in excess of a. To
avoid any possible incoherence, the stronger condi-
tion of x ≤ a for all x must be applied before the
analysis can be conducted in terms of mean and
variance.
To see why it is insufficient to exclude assets with
µ ≥ a, contrary to conventional shorthand (e.g.,
Lengwiler, 2004, page 96), consider a two-point dis-
tribution yielding wealth of either x= x1 or x= x2
with equal probability p= 0.5. The expected quadra-
tic utility is then [(2ax1− x
2
1)+ (2ax2− x
2
2)]/2 and,
hence, the equi-utility (x1, x2) indifference-contours
are concentric circles centred at (a, a), as shown in
Figure 3. Further, with p= 0.5, the constraint that
Fig. 3. Necessary constraint of possible payoffs x1 and x2.
µ < a requires that we consider only (x1, x2) pairs
to the left of the solid diagonal line (x1+x2)/2 = a.
The problem is that this constraint does not re-
move the (x1, x2) pairs highlighted by the two solid
thick sections on one of the indifference contours.
Clearly, however, the assets so indicated are not in-
different. In both the dark highlighted parts of the
indifference curve, the rightmost (x1, x2) pairs are
preferred by any rational decision-maker, because in
both cases a shift to the right means that x1 and x2
both increase. To avoid this source of incoherence,
it is essential to limit the analysis to asset pairs in
the lower-left quadrant, where neither x1 nor x2 is
greater than a.
It is at first disconcerting that this constraint on
x did not arise in our “first principles” derivation in
Section 6. The reason for this is that the axioms on
which this analysis is based are too minimal (they
concern µ and σ but say nothing directly about x)
and are insufficient to reveal the difference between
the asset (x1, x2) pairs highlighted in Figure 3. The
example depicted in Figure 3 reveals clearly, how-
ever, that it is essential to exclude all such assets
before taking on the convenience of working in terms
of distribution moments (σ,µ).
This example should be seen as an alternative ver-
sion of Borch’s paradox. Borch relied on his rather
opaque counterexample to condemn MV analysis
generally, but the more reasonable conclusion, rec-
ognized by Baron, is that MV analysis can mimic a
coherent application of EU under quadratic utility
provided that the asset class is suitably restricted
before the distributional properties of those assets
are reduced to their parameters (σ,µ). This is the
same restriction as is necessary for coherence under
EU when assuming QU, and reflects a long-known
defect of the quadratic utility function rather than
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any flaw in the mathematical restatement of ex-
pected quadratic utility in terms of mean and vari-
ance.
It can be argued that the need to exclude as-
sets with potentially “high” payoffs from any anal-
ysis under quadratic utility (whether via MV or EU
methods) is particularly bothersome, since that is
when the decision-maker may feel most interest in
the analysis. This is a problem for QU rather than
for just the MV expression of QU.
7.2 Normally Distributed Payoffs
If the class of returns distributions is restricted to
a scale-location family with density f [(x− k)/b]/b,
given fixed f but variable k and b, the decision-
maker’s expected utility will depend only on k and b,
and typically on σ and µ. This will lead to indiffer-
ence curves in the (σ,µ)-plane. A popular special
case is to consider only assets belonging to the class
of normal distributions, f [(x−µ)/σ]/σ. If, for exam-
ple, we specialize further by considering the class of
utility functions of constant absolute risk aversion,
u(x) = 1− exp[−κx], for some κ > 0, the expected
utility is easily evaluated to be
1− exp[−κµ+ κ2σ2/2].(9)
It follows immediately that EU indifference curves
in the (σ2, µ)-plane are straight lines, µ− κσ2/2 =
constant (where the higher the constant, the higher
the EU). In the (σ,µ) plane, these same curves ap-
pear as parabolas, all with axes σ = 0 and increasing
in µ as σ increases. These contain none of the inher-
ent contradictions revealed in the case of the circu-
lar indifference curves derived from either Buridan
or the assumption of quadratic utility.
It is important to understand how we have arrived
at a case of parabolic indifference curves in appar-
ent contradiction with the circles based on Buri-
dan. These different families of indifference curves
emanate from different starting points. To get the
Buridan (circular) curves, we presume what is im-
plicit under quadratic utility—specifically, that all
available assets (“mixed” or “pure”) are represented
sufficiently by just (σ,µ). Similarly, to arrive at the
normal-constant-risk-aversion (parabolic) indifference
curves, we make a contrary and more restrictive as-
sumption, namely, that all possible assets have nor-
mal distributions.
Derivation of indifference curves on the assump-
tion of strictly normal distributions does not sit well
with Buridan’s axiom. This class of distributions is
not closed under probability mixing, since probabil-
ity mixtures of normals are typically not normal. It
is self-defeating, therefore, to arbitrarily limit the
admissible asset class to just normal distributions,
since mixture assets can always be constructed by
randomization whether or not they arise naturally.
From a utility theory standpoint, this issue can
be summed up as follows. If normal assets with pa-
rameters (σ1, µ1) and (σ2, µ2) have expected util-
ities u1 = V (σ1, µ1) and u2 = V (σ2, µ2), then any
probability mixture thereof, defined by α, has ex-
pected utility uα = αu1 + (1 − α)u2. Such calcula-
tions are elementary to expected utility theory, yet
cannot be captured or exhibited in any way using
a set of indifference curves applicable to only nor-
mal distributions. The parameters of a nonnormal
probability mixture, (σα, µα), are known but mean-
ingless, since they cannot be substituted into (9) or
any other measure of the expected utility of a nor-
mal distribution. They can, of course, be substituted
into (8), but that would presume quadratic utility
rather than normality.
7.2.1 Chipman–Baron defence of normality Hav-
ing first revealed that Borch’s paradox exploits a
defect in QU rather than one in MV per se, Baron
(1977) went on to rationalize the use of MV in-
difference curves under the common presumption
of only normal distributions. This further contribu-
tion, elaborating upon Chipman [(1973), pages 179–
181] rests primarily on the assumption that assets
are all highly divisible, thereby allowing investors to
hold them in conventional linearly weighted portfo-
lios with arbitrary positive weights (e.g., the investor
can buy $3.121 worth of asset A and $6.879 worth
of asset B in a $10 portfolio).
Linearly weighted portfolios have two helpful prop-
erties. First, as is well known, the class of jointly nor-
mal distributions is closed under linear combination.
Second, and essential to the Chipman–Baron argu-
ment, it follows from Jensen’s inequality that for any
increasing and strictly concave (risk averse) utility
function u(x), the expected utility of an α-mixture
of any two assets A and B is less than the expected
utility of the corresponding α-weighted portfolio of
the same two assets, α ∈ (0,1). Thus, even for risk
averse utility functions that cannot be represented
in terms of solely (σ,µ), there is always a conven-
tional weighted portfolio of A and B that domi-
nates any probability mixture of A and B. Prob-
ability mixtures can thus be ignored by any rational
risk averse expected utility maximizer, provided of
course that it is possible to combine the available
pure assets into arbitrarily weighted portfolios.
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By excluding all probability mixture assets, Chip-
man and Baron got around the problem that mix-
tures of normals are not normal, and thus made it
feasible to work on the assumption that the asset
class worthy of consideration includes only jointly
normal distributions. This leaves the problem, of
course, of how to choose between such normally dis-
tributed assets (both the pure assets and their
weighted portfolios).
On this issue, Baron emphasized two points. First,
the assumption that all assets are normal allows
decision-makers with essentially any increasing util-
ity function to draw (σ,µ) indifference curves. For
instance, a decision-maker with exponential utility
has parabolic (σ,µ) indifference curves. Second, it is
wrong to draw an arbitrary set of convex (σ,µ) in-
difference curves and presume that they derive from
some sensible risk averse utility function. To the
contrary, as occurs in Borch’s paradox, a set of ap-
parently quite plausible looking indifference curves
drawn on the basis of intuition, rather than being de-
rived from an underlying utility function u(x), will
generally embody preferences between at least some
definable assets that are obviously irrational.
This second point, due initially to Chipman
[(1973), pages 168 and 169] is not widely known. It is
commonplace, especially in classroom and textbook
contexts, to draw up any “sensible looking” usually
convex (σ,µ) indifference curves, as if the investor
has free reign to take on any curves she likes. This
fundamental misconception underlines why time can
be well spent revisiting the analytical literature on
MV versus EU from the Borch era. The depth of
this literature is exhibited in the way that Chip-
man [(1973), page 169] was able to characterize the
MV indifference curves from which an expected util-
ity function can be recovered. Specifically, Chipman
proved that when the choice is between only nor-
mal distributions, the utility function u(x) must be
bounded over −∞ < x <∞ by the condition that
|u(x)| ≤ a exp(bx2), a, b > 0 so as to ensure that the
expected utility integral converges. Given this growth
constraint on u(x), there exists an indifference func-
tion V (σ,µ) =E[u(x)] under the necessary and suffi-
cient condition that V (σ,µ) satisfies the differential
equation
1
σ
∂V
∂σ
=
∂2V
∂µ2
.
7.2.2 Mixture assets in practice Baron [(1977), pa-
ge 1692] and Liu [(2004), page 233] discuss how
probability mixtures of different assets occur, explic-
itly or implicitly. For instance, the cash flows from
a firm might have different probability distributions
depending on a random event such as the outcome
of a law suit, the reaction of competitors or a regu-
latory or political shift.
There is no stock market for explicit mixtures
of different individual stocks. Indeed, Baron’s ar-
gument suggests that there could be little if any
rational demand for these. As an interesting aside,
however, in some betting markets there is a com-
mercially successful product called a “mystery bet”,
where the buyer agrees to be allocated a random bet
of agreed amount (e.g., a $10 bet on a random horse
in a random race).
A fully subjectivist view of real world stock mar-
ket investment would suggest that much “rational
investment” is tantamount to making “mystery bets”,
in that there are so many random factors outside the
control or observation of the investor that determine
how the payoffs from her chosen investments are dis-
tributed. On this view, every discrete asset (com-
pany stock) in the stockmarket is in fact a mixture
of distributions, and the investor has a subjective
assessment of that stock’s payoffs which amounts to
a subjective mixture distribution of latent “under-
lying stocks”.
8. BORCH AND STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE
The axioms of EU do not insist that the decision-
maker should prefer more rather than less. To make
this basic presumption of human behavior, the util-
ity function u(x) must be a monotonically increas-
ing function of the payoff x. Once this assumption
is made of u(x), it is possible to argue either on
the grounds of utility theory or mere common sense
that some distributions of payoffs strictly dominate
others. To begin with, if one distribution f1(x) is
entirely to the right of another f2(x), then any in-
vestor who prefers more to less will favour f1(x).
A little less obviously, the same order of strict pref-
erence holds whenever the cumulative probability of
any given outcome x≥ x∗ is higher under f1(x) than
under f2(x) for all x
∗. Specifically, f1 is weakly pre-
ferred to f2 whenever F2(x
∗)−F1(x
∗)≥ 0 for all x∗,
where F (x) is the cumulative distribution function
corresponding to probability density f(x).
This condition is known following Hadar and Rus-
sell (1969) as first order stochastic dominance (FSD).
Its implication is that the expected utility of distri-
bution f1(x) exceeds the expected utility of distri-
bution f2(x) for all strictly increasing u(x). Hadar
and Russell (1969) also proved that if the class of
decision-makers is limited to only those with risk
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averse u(x), f1 is weakly preferred to f2 if and only
if
∫ a
−∞
[F2(x)−F1(x)]dx≥ 0 for all a >−∞ (the po-
tential payoffs are −∞≤ x≤∞). This is known as
second order stochastic dominance (SSD).
The conditions of stochastic dominance discovered
by Hadar and Russell (1969), and independently
by Hanoch and Levy (1969), proceed by constrain-
ing not the class of asset distributions f(x), but
rather the class of decision-makers. Decision-makers
are categorized in effect by the Pratt–Arrow mea-
sure of absolute risk aversion r(x) = −u′′(x)/u′(x),
which is constant under positive linear transforma-
tions of u(x) and hence characterizes decision-makers
uniquely [i.e., such that any two decision-makers
with the same preferences have the same r(x)]. FSD
is an implicit dominance criterion for any decision-
maker with increasing twice differentiable utility
(−∞ < r(x) <∞), whereas SSD is implicit in the
decision criteria of any risk averse decision-maker
(0 < r(x) <∞). Meyer (1977) provides a succinct
overview and generalization of the Hadar and Rus-
sell (1969) and Hanoch and Levy (1969) proofs. See
Levy (2006) for a comprehensive synthesis of the
theory of stochastic dominance as a framework for
decision-making under uncertainty. Levy [(2012),
Chapter 3] shows that with normal distributions,
SSD is equivalent to the MV criterion, and can be
used as the axiomatic basis on which to derive it.
Fishburn (1980) made significant strides towards a
general theory of ranking assets in order of stochas-
tic dominance using only their moments. He proved,
for example, that (i) first order stochastic domi-
nance of asset A over asset B implies that µA > µB ,
and (ii) second order stochastic dominance of asset
A over asset B implies that µA ≥ µB and σA < σB .
Similar conditions involving higher moments follow
necessarily under higher orders of stochastic dom-
inance. These proofs have not led to a theory of
ranking all assets via moments because the moment
conditions are necessary but not sufficient to prove
stochastic dominance at their respective levels. This
has recently been emphasized by Liu [(2004),
pages 231 and 232] who gave a general proof that
there is no specifiable set of moment conditions con-
cerning the first n moments of A and B that imply
a first, second or third order dominance relationship
between those two assets. Essentially, while certain
moment conditions are suggestive of certain orders
of stochastic dominance, those conditions can still
arise when their corresponding order of dominance
does not obtain.
Levy and Sarnat (1969) employed the principle of
FSD to rebut Borch. They explained that the basic
mistake in Borch’s logic is to treat the joint con-
ditions that µ1 > µ2 and σ1 > σ2 as if these alone
are sufficient for two assets (σ1, µ1) and (σ2, µ2) to
be seen by someone as indifferent and positioned on
the same indifference curve. Their counterargument
is that while µ1 > µ2 and σ1 >σ2 are necessary un-
der risk aversion for indifference, these conditions
are not sufficient. So much is proven by Borch’s own
example, in which two specified assets meeting both
conditions are obviously not indifferent.
Levy and Sarnat (1969) go on to reveal that one
of the two assets in Borch’s example is FSD over the
other. Again, this is clear since one asset produces
x or y1 with probability p and the other produces
x or y2 with the same probability, implying that
if y1 > y2, for instance, then the cumulative distri-
bution of asset 1 is weakly to the right of asset 2.
The Levy and Sarnat antidote to Borch is thus to
adopt a modified application of MV where in the
first step the admissible asset class is immediately
and efficiently reduced by removing all assets that
are dominated under FSD (and hence are not in the
efficient set for any decision-maker with increasing
utility). This two-stage procedure was first proposed
in Hanoch and Levy (1969) and later by Levy (1974)
and Levy and Sarnat (1972), pages 315–318. There
can be no argument against FSD from any angle. In
the words of a referee, it is “normatively desirable
and descriptively accurate”.
9. THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
The restatement of a subset of EU in the language
of MV led immediately to formulation of the capi-
tal asset pricing model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964),
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). In this section
we set out a simple derivation of the CAPM and ex-
plain briefly what it offers that might not have been
discovered without MV.
There are n risky assets in the market and the
price of asset j is Pj (j = 1,2, . . . , n). The investor
spreads her money between risky assets and risk-
free bonds. Her portfolio weights are therefore wrf
in the risk-free asset and wM = 1−wrf in the mar-
ket. Her investment in the market (risky assets) is
spread evenly across all n risky assets in proportion
to their respective prices. She earns return rrf from
the risk free asset and rM from the market portfo-
lio of risky assets. By definition, the return on the
market portfolio is rM =
∑
j Pjrj/
∑
j Pj , where rj
is the return on asset j.
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Suppose that rrf is less than both expected returns
µ(rM ) and µ(rj), as must be the case to attract risk
averse investors. To increase the expected return of
her investment portfolio, the first possibility is that
the investor buys some more of asset j using some
of the money she has invested in the risk-free as-
set. Her new portfolio weights are then wM in the
market portfolio, δ in security j and wrf − δ in the
risk-free asset. The expected return of this portfo-
lio is wMµ(rM ) + δµ(rj) + (wrf − δ)rrf and its vari-
ance is w2Mσ
2(rM ) + δ
2σ2(rj) + 2wM δ cov(rj , rM ).
The marginal increase in expected return is there-
fore δµ(rj) − δrrf . Similarly, the marginal increase
in portfolio variance is δ2σ2(rj)+2wMδ cov(rj , rM ),
which approaches 2wM δ cov(rj , rM ) for small δ. The
marginal rate of substitution, or price in terms of
added risk (variance) for each extra unit of expected
return (mean), is thus
µ(rj)− rrf
2wM cov(rj , rM)
.(10)
The second way for the investor to increase expected
return is to sell weight δ of the risk-free asset and
add weight δ to her investment in the market port-
folio. By an identical argument to that above, the
marginal rate of substitution is then
µ(rM )− rrf
2wMσ2(rM )
.(11)
Setting (10) = (11), on the basis that there cannot
be two different unit prices to achieve the same re-
sult in a rational market (the “law of no arbitrage”),
leads to the equation commonly known as the mean–
variance CAPM
µ(rj) = rrf +
cov(rj , rM )
σ2(rM )
[µ(rM )− rrf ].(12)
To rewrite this equation in terms of asset prices
rather than returns, let the return on asset j be
defined in terms of its initial price Pi and its period-
end price or value Vj by rj = Vj/Pj − 1. Hence, by
definition, µ(ri) = µ(Vi)/Pi − 1, cov(ri, rM ) =
cov(Vj , VM )/PjPM and σ(rM ) = σ(VM )/PM . Sub-
stituting in (12) and rearranging reveals the CAPM
as an explicit pricing model
Pj =
µ(Vj)− βj [µ(VM )− PM (1 + rrf)]
1 + rrf (
PM =
∑
j
Pj
)
,
where βj = cov(Vj , VM)/σ
2(VM ).
The CAPM asset prices Pj can be understood as
either (i) coherent prices in the mind of a given in-
vestor with quadratic utility, or (ii) market equi-
librium prices in a market where all investors have
quadratic utility and the same probability beliefs
regarding the uncertain future asset values Vj . The
wider possibility drawing on the Chipman–Baron ar-
gument is that only normally distributed assets need
be considered, in which case the investor(s) need not
have quadratic utility.
The appeal of the CAPM equation is that rather
than looking at assets one by one, each risky asset is
valued with respect to what it contributes to an op-
timally weighted portfolio. Upon taking this unified
rather than piecemeal approach, the CAPM reveals
the factors, most interestingly βj , that make each as-
set more or less valuable to decision-makers seeking
an optimal mix of investments. Particularly reveal-
ing is that the risk of investing in a given asset is
measured not by its variance, but by its covariance
with all other risky assets. An asset can therefore
be highly risky of itself and yet still be highly at-
tractive. Furthermore, even an asset with negative
expected return might have a high price Pj if its
returns have negative correlation with the market.
Borch (1979) was of course well aware of the CAPM,
which he described as having in finance something
like the status of E = mc2. He was critical of the
CAPM for the fact that it stands on MV foundations
and is therefore open to the same kind of “nonsense
results” as generalized MV decision-making. Antic-
ipating what has more recently become very widely
accepted, Borch (1979) noted that the CAPM did
not perform well when fitted to actual market price
data. Levy (2012) has recently reviewed the history
and status of the CAPM, with emphasis on how it
has survived as a highly important tool in financial
practice while at the same time having its empirical
or descriptive validity widely disparaged.
A more sympathetic view of the CAPM (Meyer
(1987), page 426) is that by effectively restating ex-
pected quadratic utility in terms of moments (σ,µ),
finance theorists uncovered a coherence relationship
between asset prices that had not been evident from
the higher plane of EU theory. Reassuringly, much
of the “new finance” inspired by MV and the CAPM
hinges on the rule of no arbitrage or “no Dutch
book”. This idea appeared much earlier in the writ-
ings of de Finetti. Indeed, it would come as no great
surprise to find that de Finetti envisaged a “subjec-
tivist CAPM”. In principle, a de Finetti style CAPM
would connect the utility functions and subjective
14 D. JOHNSTONE AND D. LINDLEY
probability distributions of all investors to a theo-
retical (and possibly observable) set of equilibrium
asset prices, and would do much to unify finance and
decision analysis at a philosophical level.
10. CONCLUSION
Mean–variance is the most influential theory in
the practice of investment analysis and business deci-
sion-making. This is remarkable given that Marko-
witz’s model is effectively a diminished form of ex-
pected utility theory. Of itself, in the elegant struc-
tures set out by Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953), Savage (1954) and other decision theorists,
utility theory is hardly known to financial practi-
tioners. This is despite its intellectual traditions and
theoretical acceptance in many fields, including some-
what paradoxically economics.
From the 1950s when Markowitz introduced what
he saw as a new theory of decision-making under
subjective probability, there has been a concerted
intellectual undertaking in financial economics to-
wards understanding how mean–variance methods
might be reconciled with expected utility. The liter-
ature on this topic is extremely wide and the task of
surveying its current state and its links to modern
financial practice is well beyond what we have at-
tempted in this paper. An historically thorough and
helpful survey of the literature exists in Liu (2004).
We focus on the historical debate concerning mean–
variance and expected utility, particularly on the
once prominent reductio absurdum of mean–variance
known as Borch’s paradox. This logical counter-argu-
ment directed by Borch at mean–variance has been
rebutted, most explicitly by Baron (1977). Despite
its hidden weak spots, Borch’s paper, and the liter-
ature that it initiated, holds timeless philosophical
interest. Opinions are widely divided on whether ex-
pected utility is “too normative” to be practical or
mean–variance is too “practical” to be respectable.
The pragmatists’ perspective is summed up by eco-
nomics Nobel Laureate James Tobin [(1969), page
14] who suggested that a business practitioner will
not be amused by the instruction that “he should
consult his utility and his subjective probabilities
and then maximize”. Yet contrary of Tobin’s mock-
ery, there is intensive theoretical and empirical study
in current finance research devoted precisely to prac-
tical investment portfolio selection by optimization
of certain expected utility functions, both directly
and by their expression through higher moments
(e.g., MacLean, Ziemba and Li (2005); Cremers, Kritz-
man and Page (2005); Sharpe (2007); Adler and
Kritzman (2007); Hagstromer et al. (2008)).
A conciliatory note among the seminal contrib-
utors to the MV versus EU literature was struck
by Meyer (1987), page 426. He saw that MV of-
fered a way of rewriting a subclass of expected util-
ity that not only simplified the notions of risk and
return, but which also revealed previously unrecog-
nized relationships between the risks and returns of
individual assets and their combinations in weighted
portfolios. This gave rise to the new language of the
“efficient frontier” and ultimately the “capital as-
set pricing model”. More fundamentally, it revealed
very interesting and sometimes counterintuitive fi-
nancial principles. In many instances these results
can be transported back into EU theory and gener-
alized to suit different possible utility functions. See,
for example, the log utility CAPM applied in John-
stone (2012). This asset pricing equation is obtain-
able from first principles for any E[log(x)] maximiz-
ing portfolio optimizer. Such equations might have
been discovered without being triggered by Markowitz
and the invention of the mean–variance CAPM, but
more realistically the academic field of asset pric-
ing was inspired by Markowitz and the theory that
arose in the era of Borch and the swinging 60s.
11. POSTSCRIPT
After completing this survey of Borch’s paradox,
the authors learnt more of the status that Borch
retains in actuarial science from a fascinating biog-
raphy by Aase (2004). The following passage from
this biography confirms much of the impression we
gained from the literature regarding Borch and his
intellectual influence over the mean–variance debate:
There is a story about Borch’s stand on “mean–
variance” analysis. This story is known to econ-
omists, but probably unknown to actuaries: He
published a paper, “A note on Uncertainty and
Indifference Curves” in Review of Economic
Studies (1969), and Martin Feldstein, a friend
of Borch, published another paper in the same
issue on the limitations of the mean–variance
analysis for portfolio choice (Feldstein, 1969).
In the same issue a comment from James Tobin
appeared, “Comment on Borch and Feldstein”
(Tobin (1969)). Today Borch’s and Feldstein’s
criticism seems well in place, but at the time
this was shocking news. In particular, Profes-
sor James Tobin at Yale, later a Nobel laure-
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ate in economics, entertained at the time great
plans for incorporating mean–variance analysis
in macroeconomic modelling. There was even
financing in place for an institute on a national
level. However, after Borch’s and Feldstein’s
papers were published, Tobin’s project seemed
to have been abandoned. After this episode, in-
volving two of the leading American economists,
Borch was well noticed by the economist com-
munity, and got a reputation, perhaps an un-
just one, as a feared opponent.
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